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Case No. 20050001-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE OF UTAH 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted certiorari to review whether the Utah Court of Appeals applied 
the correct standard of review in State v. Levin, 2004 UT App 596,101 P.3d 846 (addendum 
A), which affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. This Court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(a) (West 2004) & Utah Code 
Ann.§ 78-2a-4 (1986). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the court of appeals apply the correct standard of review in reviewing the 
district court's determination that Defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)? 
Standard of Review: On certiorari review, this Court reviews the decision of the 
court of appeals, not the trial court, for correctness and without deference to its conclusions 
of law. State v. James, 2000 UT 80, \ 8,13 P.3d 576 (citations omitted). "The correctness 
of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that court accurately reviewed the trial 
court's decision under the appropriate standard of review." Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The court of appeals affirmed the conviction and the trial court's denial of 
Defendant's motion to suppress in State v. Levin, 2004 UT App 396, 101 P.3d 846 
(addendum A). This Court subsequently granted Defendant's petition for writ of certiorari 
(addendum B). 
B. Lower Court Proceedings 
Defendant was charged with possession or use of marijuana with a prior conviction, 
a class A misdemeanor; possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor; and open 
container in vehicle, a class C misdemeanor (R. 2). Defendant pled no contest to the open 
container charge (R. 9). 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress all incriminating statements made by him prior 
to being advised of his Miranda rights (R. 26). Following a hearing, the motion to suppress 
was denied (R. 72, 109-118, 292:85). The trial court found that Defendant was not in 
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custody and was not subject to interrogation when he made the incriminating statements (R. 
109-118) (addendum C). 
Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of possession or use of marijuana 
and possession of drug paraphernalia (R. 151). Defendant was sentenced to a term of 365 
days in jail, however the sentence was suspended on certain conditions (R. 180-83). 
The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. State v. Levin, 2004 UT App 396,101 
P.3d 846. The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court's determination that Defendant 
was not subject to interrogation for Miranda purposes, however it agreed that Defendant 
was not in custody when the interview took place. Levin, 2004 UT App 396, ^ 11 - 12. 
This Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari as to the following issue: 
"Whether the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review in reviewing the 
district court's determination that the defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda 
protections." (addendum B). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 1 or 2, 2001, sheriffs deputy Keith was patrolling around the Provo Dike 
Road (R. 292:17-18; 294:16-17). He saw a convertible with its top down with some people 
in it parked by the side of the road (R. 292:18-19, 29; 294:17-18). He noticed that the 
registration had expired. Id. He did not activate his overhead lights or siren. He just 
stopped to talk to the driver to see if he was aware that the registration was expired. Id. 
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There were three people in the car and the person sitting in the driver's seat was defendant 
(R. 292:19-20; 294:18). 
The deputy saw several open containers of alcohol in the car (R. 292:20; 294:19). 
The deputy had all of the people get out of the car so that he could do a search to see how 
many open containers were in the car (R. 292:20; 294:20). No one was placed in handcuffs, 
and his weapon was not drawn (R. 292:21). 
There was a compartment between the driver's seat and the passenger's seat (R. 
292:21; 294:20). When the deputy opened this compartment he smelled the odor of 
marijuana (R. 294:21). There was a socket wrench or ratchet in the compartment that had 
both burned and some residual unburned marijuana in it (R. 292:21; 294:22).! The deputy 
also looked inside a backpack that was in the car and found three baggies with marijuana 
in them and a film canister containing marijuana (R. 292:22-23; 294:27).2 There were also 
several pills in a small plastic bag (R. 294:30). Richard, the backseat passenger, said that 
the backpack was his (R. 294:26). 
Deputy Keith called for the assistance of other deputies who were drug recognition 
experts (DRE) (R. 294:33; 292:23). The deputies performed some field sobriety tests and 
drug recognition tests on Defendant (R. 292:23; 294:33, 35). Defendant passed the field 
1
 At trial, Defendant stipulated that there was marijuana in the socket (R. 294:24). 
2
 At trial, Defendant stipulated that the film canister contained marijuana (R. 
294:31). The crime lab also tested the material from the film canister and determined that 
it was marijuana (R. 294:32). 
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sobriety tests (R. 292:24; 294:36). However, the DRE officers determined that Defendant's 
pulse rate was fast and marijuana will make your pulse go faster (R. 294:73,76). When his 
eyes were tested, Defendant had a lack of convergence, which is also a sign associated with 
marijuana use (R. 294:78-79).3 The DRE officers told deputy Keith that Defendant was 
showing signs that he could be under the influence of marijuana (R. 294:85-88; 95-96 
292:25,31). 
Deputy Keith pulled Defendant aside - about 15 to 20 feet away from the other 
passengers - to talk to him about the things he had found in the car (R. 294:36). Deputy 
Keith asked Defendant about the socket and Defendant insisted that he didn't know it was 
there and that he had not smoked marijuana out of it (R. 292:25; 294:37). Deputy Keith 
commented that "[tjhere's no doubt in my mind that you've been smoking marijuana." (R. 
292:26). Defendant then said that "he had taken a couple hits" and that both he and Richard 
had smoked out of a pipe that the deputy had not yet located (R. 292:27; 294:37-40). 
At trial, Defendant testified that he told the deputy "I don't smoke marijuana, and I 
haven't smoked marijuana."4 (R. 294:181). However, Defendant admitted that he later told 
the deputy that he had taken "a couple of hits," and that he had smoked out of the same pipe 
3
 At trial, Defendant testified that the morning of the incident he had taken an anti-
inflammatory medication and a Lortab for a shoulder injury (R. 294:174). However, pain 
pills that are narcotic analgesics, such as Lortab, cause blood pressure, pulse and 
temperature to go down - so the pulse rate would be lower, not higher. They also cause a 
convergence of the eyes, not a lack of convergence (R. 294:76-77). 
4
 Evidence of Defendant's prior conviction for possession of marijuana was 
admitted for purposes of impeachment (R. 294:198, 210-11). 
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Richard smoked out of (R. 294:184,209). Defendant claimed that he only said this so that 
he could get things over with and leave, because he didn't want to go to jail, didn't want to 
have his car impounded and he knew that one of the passengers needed to get home (R. 
294:184,209). 
Deputy Keith also spoke with Richard, who admitted that he had been smoking 
marijuana with Defendant (R. 294:41). Richard initially said that he and Defendant had 
been smoking marijuana out of the ratchet (R. 294:42). But after deputy Keith told him that 
Defendant said they had been smoking out of another pipe, Richard said that they had 
smoked the marijuana out of a pipe that he had thrown into the lake (R. 294:41-44). 
Defendant was not arrested at the time, but was given a citation; he then drove away 
from the scene (R, 292:41, 294:64, 68). As the car was pulling away, one of the deputies 
saw a pipe directly underneath where the car had been parked (R. 294:64). Deputy Keith 
asked if this was the pipe that they had used to smoke marijuana and Richard said that it was 
(R. 294:65). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals applied the correct standard of review, which included allowing 
a degree of discretion to the trial court's application of the law to the facts. The court of 
appeals properly affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress his 
incriminating statements because he was not in custody for Miranda purposes when the 
statements were made. Even if it was not correct for the court of appeals to give deference 
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to the trial court, any error was harmless because the court of appeals would have reached 
the same conclusion without any deference given to the trial court. Finally, even if the court 
of appeals had reached a different conclusion and Defendant's statements had been 
suppressed, any error was harmless because there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury 
would have acquitted Defendant even without his incriminating statements. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE CORRECT 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
This Court granted certiorari review to determine whether the court of appeals 
applied the correct standard of review in reviewing the district court's determination that the 
defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda protections. 
"[T]he primary function of a standard of review is to apportion power and, 
consequently, responsibility between trial and appellate courts for determining an issue or 
a class of issues." State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1265-66 (Utah 1993). "Put another 
way, a standard of review allocates discretion between trial and appellate courts." Id. at 
1266. This Court fashions standards of review that it thinks "best allocate responsibility 
between appellate and trial courts in light of the particular determination under review." Id 
Defendant argues that the court of appeals applied an incorrect standard of review 
(Def. 's brief at 18). Defendant concedes that the court of appeals correctly cited the factors 
for determining whether a person is in custody; however, he argues that the court of appeals 
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erroneously afforded the trial court deference in its application of fact to law (Def.'s brief 
at 17-19). 
The court of appeals applied the following standard of review: "In reviewing the trial 
court's denial of [a defendant's] motion to suppress, we examine the underlying factual 
findings for clear error, and review the trial court's conclusions of law based thereon for 
correctness." State v. Levin, 2004 UT App. 396 at % 7 (quotations and citations omitted). 
The court of appeals went on to state that "because the determination of custody is fact-
sensitive and 'the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied are so complex and varying 
that no rule adequately addressing the relevance of all these facts can be spelled out,' we 
recognize that the trial court has a degree of discretion 'unless such determination exceeds 
established legal boundaries.'" Id. (quoting State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 929 (Utah 
App. 2994) (quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994)). 
A. This Court has consistently upheld the standard of review applied 
by the court of appeals in Levin. 
In this case, both parties agree that in making a determination as to whether a person 
is in custody for Miranda purposes, a court should review the four factors set out in Salt 
Lake City v. Carrier, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983); and see State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 
1993). Defendant concedes that the court of appeals correctly cited the four Carner factors 
(Def.'s brief at 17). 
Therefore, the parties do not disagree about the legal standard to determine whether 
a person was in custody for Miranda purposes. The question in dispute involves the 
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standard of review to be used in reviewing a trial court's application of the law to the facts. 
The same question was raised in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). In Pena, 
this Court set out a lengthy and well-reasoned analysis of the correct standard of review. 
Pena moved to suppress statements he made prior to his arrest. The trial court denied his 
motions. Id. at 934. This Court stated that "[t]rial courts are given primary responsibility 
for making determinations of fact. Findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate court under 
the clearly erroneous standard." Id. at 935. In addition, a reviewing court must resolve "all 
disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination." Id. at 
936. This Court acknowledged that the "standard is highly deferential to the trial court 
because it is before that court that the witnesses and parties appear and the evidence is 
adduced." Id. 
However, "appellate review of a trial court's determination of the law is usually 
characterized by the term 'correctness.' . . . [and] 'correctness' means the appellate court 
decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's 
determination of law." Id. (citations omitted). But these standards do not tell a court "how 
closely [it] should scrutinize the application of a statement of legal principle to a specific 
set of facts." Id. at 937. Pena explained that "what a legal principle means in reality can 
often be determined only by considering how its general terms are given sharp definition 
through their application to a series of specific fact situations." Id. 
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The Pena court discussed this issue as "a third category - the application of law to 
fact or, stated more fully, the determination of whether a given set of facts comes within the 
reach of a given rule of law." Pena, 869 P.2d at 936. Pena held that it would "review the 
trial court's legal conclusion of a valid waiver [of Miranda rights] for correctness. . . . 
However, this standard of review grants a measure of discretion to the trial court because 
of the variability of the factual settings." Id. at 941 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Levin, the court of appeals concluded that "the trial court has a degree 
of discretion" in applying the legal rule to the facts. Levin, 204 Ut App. 396 at ^ f 7. It based 
this conclusion on the fact that "the determination of custody is fact-sensitive and the facts 
to which the legal rule is to be applied are so complex and varying that no rule adequately 
addressing the relevance of all these facts can be spelled out." Id. (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
Defendant argues that although the court of appeals said that it would give the trial 
court "a degree of discretion," the appellate court afforded the trial court "considerable 
discretion." Defendant argues that the court of appeals erred in granting the trial court 
"considerable discretion" (Def.'s brief at 19-20). However, Defendant fails to establish the 
difference between "considerable discretion" and "a degree of discretion." As the Pena 
court recognized, the "'some discretion' standard is less than precise, but so are many legal 
standards." Pena, 869 P.2d at 940, n. 6. 
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Defendant then argues that the court of appeals granted "total discretion" rather than 
a degree of discretion or even considerable discretion, in determining whether deputy 
Keith's comment to Defendant was so accusatory that it would affect how a reasonable 
person would gauge the breadth of his freedom of action (Def.'s brief at 22). However, the 
court of appeals clearly states that in determining this question, "we afford the trial court 
considerable discretion." Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at ^ [ 21. It then found that the trial court 
had not abused its discretion in determining that although deputy Keith's comment was 
accusatory, "it was not overly accusatory." Id. at \ 22. Therefore, the court of appeals did 
not grant the trial court "total discretion" as Defendant claims, but applied the correct 
standard of review in granting a degree of discretion to the trial court. 
The same standard of review applied in Pena was re-affirmed by this Court a few 
years later in State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738 (Utah 1997). Leyva moved to suppress his 
incriminating statements. The trial court denied his motion, concluding the Leyva had 
"voluntarily waived his Miranda rights." Leyva, 951 P.2d at 740. This Court held that "[a]n 
appellate court should 'review the trial court's legal conclusion of a valid waiver [of 
Miranda rights] for correctness. However, this standard of review grants a measure of 
discretion to the trial court because of the variability of the factual settings.'" Leyva, 951 
P.2d at 741 (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 941 (Utah 1994). 
Numerous other cases have followed the reasoning set out in Pena as to the correct 
standard of review. See State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922,929 (Utah App. 1994) (trial court 
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has some discretion to apply legal standards to unique fact situations. Appellate courts 
accord a measure o f discretion to the trial court's determination unless it exceeds established 
legal boundaries); State v. Stausberg, 895 P.2d 831, 834, n. 5 (Utah App. 1995) (trial court 
given considerable discretion where legal standard is applied to highly variable facts); State 
v. Riggs, 1999 UT App 271, If 7, 987 P.2d 1281 ("the trial court's application of the legal 
standard to the facts should be given a measure of discretion"); State v. Zesiger, 2003 UT 
App 37, Tf 7, 65 P.3d 314, cert denied, 73 P.3d 946 ("a measure of discretion [is] given to 
the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts") (quoting State v. Moreno, 910 
P.2d 1245,1247) (Utah App 1996)). 
Defendant argues that the court of appeals has not consistently applied the same 
standard of review to Miranda issues (Def.'s brief at 20). Even if true, this is irrelevant 
since this Court has consistently upheld the correct standard - the same standard applied in 
this case. In addition, any difference in court of appeals decisions is merely because 
sometimes the deference standard is not specifically mentioned. See e.g. State v. Sampson, 
808 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Utah App. 1991) (on appeal, neither party identified any standard of 
review); State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 81 (Utah App. 1998) ("We review the trial 
court[cs] factual findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error, while 
conclusions of law are viewed for correctness."); State v. Allred, 2002 UT App. 29, f 8, 55 
P.3d 1158 ("In reviewing the trial court's denial of [Defendant's] motion to suppress, we 
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examine the underlying factual findings for clear error, and review the trial court's 
conclusions of law based thereon for correctness."). 
In this case, the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review. It recognized 
that the determination of custody for Miranda purposes is extremely fact-sensitive, and "the 
facts to which the legal rule is to be applied are so complex and varying that no rule 
adequately addressing the relevance of all these facts can be spelled out." Levin, 2004 UT 
App 396 at \ 7. Therefore, the trial court was given a "degree of discretion" in its 
application of the law to the facts, and the court of appeals correctly determined that the trial 
court had not abused its discretion. Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at fflf 7 and 22. 
B. The non-deferential standard of State v. Brake should 
not be applied to Miranda cases. 
In State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, 103 P.3d 699, an officer conducted a warrantless 
search of a car and found cocaine. The trial court denied Brake's motion to suppress the 
evidence and the court of appeals affirmed. This Court reversed. Id. at % 1. The court of 
appeals applied "the standard of review generally applicable to mixed questions of law and 
fact." Id. at f 12. This Court noted that at the time the court of appeals issued its opinion, 
the non-deferential standard of review had not been expressly extended. Id. at Tf 15. 
However, in Brake, this court specifically "abandoned] the standard which extended 'some 
deference' to the application of law to the underlying factual findings in search and seizure 
cases in favor of non-deferential review." Id. at \ 15. 
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Defendant argues that the determination of whether a person is in custody for 
Miranda purposes is analogous to the determination of whether a search and seizure was 
lawful (Def.'s brief at 25). He therefore argues that the standard of review applied in Brake 
to a search and seizure issue should be adopted for review of motions to suppress pre-
Miranda statements. 
However, Brake makes it very clear that the standard of non-deferential review 
applies specifically "in search and seizure cases." Brake, 2004 UT 95 at H 15. This Court 
has clearly and specifically held in Pena and Leyva the standard of review to be applied in 
Miranda cases. Those cases involved waiver of Miranda rights, rather than a determination 
of whether defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes. However, cases involving 
Miranda rights are certainly more applicable to other Miranda cases than cases involving 
search and seizure issues. 
The Brake standard has not been and should not be adopted for Miranda cases. The 
determination of whether a search and seizure was lawful is not the same as the 
determination as to whether a person was in custody for Miranda purposes. A person may 
be "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes but not be "in custody" for Miranda or Fifth 
Amendment purposes. Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147. A person is only "in custody" for 
Miranda purposes when his "freedom of action is curtailed to an extent associated with 
formal arrest." Id. citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440. There are numerous factors that must 
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be considered in determining whether a person is "in custody" for Miranda purposes. The 
fact that a person is not free to leave is not dispositive as it is in a seizure case. 
In Pena, this Court discussed three reasons "useful for discerning when some degree 
of discretion ought to be left to a trial court." Pena, 869 P.2d at 939. These reasons are: 
(i) when the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied are so complex 
and varying that no rule adequately addressing the relevance of all 
these facts can be spelled out; 
(ii) when the situation to which the legal principle is to be applied is 
sufficiently new to the courts that appellate judges are unable to 
anticipate and articulate definitively what factors should be outcome 
determinative; and 
(iii) when the trial judge has observed 'facts,5 such as a witness's 
appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that 
cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to the appellate 
courts. 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 939. 
Reason (ii) may not often apply, since Miranda issues generally will not involve a 
situation where the legal principle to be applied is new to the courts. However, reasons (i) 
and (iii) will very frequently apply to Miranda cases, and continue to provide strong reasons 
for why a degree of discretion should be given to the trial court in Miranda cases. The facts 
surrounding when a statement was made, whether the person was in custody, whether he 
was being interrogated, whether he volunteered his statement, and whether he waived his 
Miranda rights, are different in each case and are often very complex. 
In addition, a suppression hearing is frequently held where testimony and evidence 
is presented prior to the trial court's determination as to whether the incriminating 
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statements should be suppressed. The trial judge therefore has the opportunity to observe 
"facts" such as a witness's appearance and demeanor. Those "facts" generally cannot be 
adequately reflected in a written record. Those types of "facts" are often not even 
mentioned in the trial court's findings of fact - even though they may be highly important 
and relevant to the trial court's ultimate determination of the issue. For these reasons, this 
Court should continue to uphold the current standard of review applied in Miranda cases -
where the trial court is given a "measure of discretion" as to its application of the law to the 
facts. 
Defendant also argues that in Rosky v. State, 111 P.3d 690 (Nev. 2005), the Nevada 
Supreme Court rec ently adopted a standard for reviewing Miranda issues where the ultimate 
legal determination is reviewed non-deferentially for correctness (Def.'s brief at 27). 
Defendant argues that Utah should adopt this same standard. However, absent an express 
mandate to follow federal standards of review, "the standard of review is a question to be 
determined by the law of the forum performing the appellate review." Thurman, 846 P.2d 
at 1266-67. Therefore, the "standard of review used by state courts is presumptively a 
question of state law." Id. at 1267. The fact that another state may have adopted a slightly 
different standard of review does not establish the standard that Utah should apply. 
II. ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS 
As argued above, the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review and 
correctly affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. However, even 
16 
if it was error for the court of appeals to give a degree of discretion to the trial court's 
application of the law to the facts, any error was harmless. Even if no deference had been 
given to the trial court, the outcome would have been the same. The court of appeals would 
still have concluded that defendant was not "in custody" for Miranda purposes, and the trial 
court's denial of his motion to suppress would still have been affirmed. 
"[Tjhe safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect's 
freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal arrest.'" Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 
(1983) (per curiam)); see also State v. Mirquet, 914 P,2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1996). Mere 
seizure, when an individual is "not free to leave" under the Fourth Amendment, is not 
determinative of whether a Miranda warning must be given. See Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147. 
Miranda warnings are designed to protect individuals from the pressures of a custodial 
interrogation that impair the free-exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination. See 
id. at 1146. 
Defendant acknowledges that in deciding that he was not in custody, the court of 
appeals correctly cited the four factors listed in Salt Lake City v. Corner, 664 P.2d 1168, 
1171 (Utah 1983) (Def.'s brief at 27). However, Defendant argues that by affording the trial 
court discretion in its application of the law to the facts, the appellate court failed to 
adequately consider the Carner factors in conjunction with the totality of the circumstances 
(Defendant brief at 28). To the contrary, a review of the court of appeals decision 
17 
establishes that the court of appeals appropriately considered all of the Carner factors within 
the totality of the circumstances of this case. Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at fflf 13-23. 
The four factors adopted by this Court to determine whether a suspect is in custody 
for Miranda purposes are: (1) the site of the interrogation; (2) whether the investigation 
focused on the accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the 
length and form of interrogation. Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147 (citing State v. Carner, 664 
P.2d 1168,1171 (Utah 1983)). See also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 321 (1994) 
(per curiam) (reciting and using four factors). The factors are considered in their totality 
with no one factor being dispositive. Id. 
The court of appeals properly considered all four factors to determine that Defendant 
was not in custody to a degree associated with formal arrest, and therefore Miranda 
warnings were not required. Even if no deference had been given to the trial court's 
application of the law to the facts, the outcome would have been the same. 
/ . Indicia of Arrest 
The court of appeals determined that there was no objective indicia of arrest. There 
were no "readied handcuffs, locked doors or drawn guns." Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at ^ 
14 (quoting Carner). Not being free to leave indicates a seizure for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, but does not, by itself, constitute a formal arrest for Fifth Amendment purposes. 
Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147. The court of appeals determined that lack of any indicia of arrest 
suggested that Defendant was not in custody. Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at \ 14. 
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2. Site of Interrogation 
Like Berkemer, Defendant was stopped on the side of a public road and the deputy's 
interaction with Defendant occurred in full view of the public. The court of appeals stated 
that "[t]raffic stops on a public road, even if in a relatively remote location, generally do not 
create the type of situation in which 'the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the 
police.'55 Levin, 2004 UT App. 396 at f 14 (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 438). The court 
of appeals held that the site of the interrogation did not suggest that Defendant was in 
custody. Id. 
3. Length and Form of Interrogation 
On appeal, Defendant's argument focused "primarily on the duration of the 
encounter, which he describes at one point as lasting an hour and at another point as lasting 
an hour and a half."5 Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at f 15. The court of appeals noted that "A 
stop for over an hour is more extensive than a routine traffic stop and, thereby, raises some 
concerns that it may be intrusive enough to constitute custody.55 Id. However, the court 
pointed out that the United States Supreme Court has rejected bright-line time limits to 
police stops. Id. at f 16. Therefore, the court of appeals considered the "reasonableness of 
the stop in light of the totality of the circumstances.55 Id. at f^ 17. 
5
 In his brief on certiorari, Defendant asserts that deputy Keith testified that it was 
about an hour before they were free to go (Def.5s brief at 10). Actually, when asked if 
more than an hour had elapsed from the initial contact to when he left, deputy Keith 
testified "I doubt it was more than an hour, but I don't know.55 (R. 294:59). 
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The court considered the fact that the officers were dealing with three suspects and 
had to 1) collect identification from each suspect; 2) investigate and collect evidence 
regarding possible open container violations; 3) investigate and collect evidence regarding 
possible drug violations; 4) summon and await the arrival of the DRE officers; 5) perform 
field sobriety tests; and 6) prepare citations. Id. The court of appeals determined that "a 
stop lasting over an hour under these circumstances is not unreasonable." Levin, 2004 UT 
App396atf 17. 
4. Focus of Investigation 
On appeal, Defendant argued that he was in custody because he was the focus of the 
investigation because deputy Keith accused him of using drugs. Levin 2004 UT App 396 
at f 18. The court of appeals held that "when a police officer expresses his suspicions to a 
suspect, those beliefs are relevant only to the extent that they would affect how a reasonable 
person in the position of the individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or 
her freedom of action." Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 
The court of appeals therefore stated that it had to "determine whether Deputy 
Keith's assertion that he knew Defendant had used drugs would cause a reasonable person 
in Defendant's position to feel his 'freedom of action' had been significantly limited." Id. 
at 1J19. 
This is the only issue as to which the court of appeals specifically stated that it was 
affording discretion to the trial court. The court of appeals said that it afforded the "trial 
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court considerable discretion" as to whether Deputy Keith's statement was so accusatory 
that it would affect how a reasonable person would gauge the breadth of his freedom of 
action. Id. at J^ 21. It said that "whether a police statement is so accusatory as to coerce a 
suspect into an unwanted confession is a question of degree for which the trial court is best 
suited to decide." Id. The trial court determined that "although the statement made by 
Deputy Keith was accusatory, it was not overly accusatory." Id. at 22. The court of appeals 
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making this determination and the 
court of appeals therefore relied on the trial court's determination. Id. at 22. 
However, even if the court of appeals had not given any discretion to the trial court 
and had not relied on the trial court's determination, it would have come to the same 
conclusion. Although the comment made by Deputy Keith ("There's no doubt in my mind 
that you've been smoking marijuana" (R. 292:26)) was accusatory, it was not sufficient to 
establish that Defendant was in custody to a degree associated with formal arrest. 
Defendant was the focus of the investigation, but, as explained in Carrier, this factor 
should be given less weight in a traffic stop. Carrier, 664 P.2d at 1171 -72. An investigation 
during a traffic stop for driving under the influence usually focuses, not on the identity of 
the perpetrator, but on whether a crime was actually committed. In such situations, "heavy 
reliance on the sole factor of upon whom the investigation was focused is not warranted." 
Id. 
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The court of appeals concluded that "[b]ased on these considerations . . . the totality 
of the circumstances in this case weigh against a determination that Defendant was in 
"custody" for Miranda purposes." Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at ^ f 23. Accordingly, the court 
of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. 
An error is harmless where there is "no reasonable likelihood that the error affected 
the outcome of the proceedings." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989); see also 
Utah R. Evid. 103(a); Utah R. Civ. P. 61; Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). Stated otherwise, "for an 
error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to 
undermine confidence in the verdict." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987). 
Even if the court of appeals erred by granting a degree of discretion to the trial 
court's application of the law to the facts, any error was harmless because the conclusion 
would have been the same whether deference was given or not. The court of appeals still 
would have concluded that Defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes. Therefore, 
his statements still would have been admissible at trial. 
In addition, even if the court of appeals had determined that Defendant was in 
custody for Miranda purposes, and Defendant's motion to suppress his pre-Miranda 
confession had been granted, any error still would have been harmless. 
Defendant was the owner and driver of the car (294:18). A socket with burned and 
unburned marijuana was found in the center console next to the driver's seat (294:20-22). 
There was also other marijuana in the car (in Richard's backpack) (294:27). Richard 
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admitted that he had been smoking marijuana with Defendant (294:41). Another marijuana 
pipe was found under the car as Defendant pulled away (294:64). When asked if this was 
the pipe they had used to smoke marijuana, Richard said that it was (294:65). Defendant 
exhibited physical signs consistent with smoking marijuana (elevated pulse and lack of eye 
convergence) (294:73,76, 78-79). Although Defendant testified that he didn't smoke 
marijuana, Defendant had previously been convicted of possession of marijuana (294:181, 
198,210-11). 
Given all of the evidence, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the jury would have acquitted Defendant, but for the admission 
of his incriminating statements.6 Therefore, any error was harmless. 
6
 In light of recent United States Supreme Court precedent, it is unclear whether 
the allegedly erroneous admission of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda 
amounts to a constitutional violation which the State must prove to be harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Compare Dickerson 
v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438-44 (2000) {Miranda was a constitutional decision 
which cannot be superceded by Congressional action) with New York v. Quarles, 467 
U.S. 649, 654 (1984) {Miranda protections are merely prophylactic and "not themselves 
rights protected by the Constitution" (quotation omitted)). Jurisdictions to have con-
sidered the issue since Dickerson generally appear to apply the Chapman standard. See, 
e.g., United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 679 (2nd Cir.) ("Since Miranda's warnings 
requirement is constitutionally based, see Dickerson [ ], 530 U.S. at 439-40 [ ], the 
admission of statements obtained in violation of its rule may be deemed harmless only if 
it appears 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error . . . did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained.'" (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24)), cert, denied, 125 S.Ct. 371 (2004); 
Kalisz v. State, 32 S.W.3d 718, 723 (Tex. App. 2000) (citing Dickerson and deeming 
Miranda violation to be constitutional error subject to harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard); Lewis v. State, 48 P.3d 1063, 1071 (Wyo. 2002) (requiring State to prove 
harmlessness and citing Chapman). However, in United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 
124 S.Ct. 2620, 2628-2629 (2004), the Supreme Court held that a failure to give Miranda 
23 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the facts and arguments set forth above, the State respectfully requests that 
this Court affirm the Court of Appeals decision and the standard of review it applied. 






Counsel for State of Utah 
warnings did not require the suppression of physical evidence derived from the suspect's 
unwarned but voluntary statements. The State submits that if the fruit of the poisonous 
tree doctrine does not apply to violations of Miranda, presumably Chapman does not 
apply either. However, even assuming that Chapman does apply, the admission of 
Defendant's incriminating statements here—if erroneous—was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, 
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Background: Defendant was convicted, after a 
jury trial in the Fourth District Court, Provo 
Department, James R. Taylor, J., of possession or 
use of marijuana with prior conviction, and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant 
appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held 
that: 
(1) officer's statement to defendant, that officer 
"knew [defendant] had smoked marijuana," was the 
functional equivalent of express questioning and 
therefore was "interrogation," as element for 
requiring Miranda warnings; but 
(2) defendant had not been in "custody," for 
Miranda purposes; and 
(3) defendant opened the door to admission, as 




[1] Criminal Law €=>H34(3) 
1 lOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases 
[1] Criminal Law €==>1158(4) 
110k! 158(4) Most Cited Cases 
In reviewing the trial court's denial of a defendant's 
motion to suppress, the appellate court examines the 
underlying factual findings for clear error, and 
reviews the trial court's conclusions of law based 
thereon for correctness. 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
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[2] Criminal Law €==>1158(2) 
1 lOkl 158(2) Most Cited Cases 
Because the determination of custody, for Miranda 
purposes, is fact-sensitive and the facts to which the 
legal rule is to be applied are so complex and 
varying that no rule adequately addressing the 
relevance of all the facts can be spelled out, 
appellate court recognizes that trial court has a 
degree of discretion unless such determination 
exceeds established legal boundaries. 
[3] Criminal Law €==>1153(1) 
1 lOkl 153(1) Most Cited Cases 
Trial court's conclusion to admit defendant's prior 
felony conviction, as impeachment evidence, would 
be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Rules of Evid., 
Rule 609. 
[4] Criminal Law €=>412.2(2) 
110k412.2(2) Most Cited Cases 
[4] Criminal Law €==>412.2(3) 
110k412.2(3) Most Cited Cases 
Police officers must provide Miranda warnings 
prior to subjecting a suspect to a "custodial 
interrogation," which is defined as questioning 
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person 
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived 
of his freedom of action in any significant way. 
[5] Criminal Law €=^412.1(4) 
110k412.1(4) Most Cited Cases 
Officer's statement to motorist, that officer "knew 
[motorist] had smoked marijuana," was the 
functional equivalent of express questioning and 
therefore was "interrogation," as element for 
requiring Miranda warnings; statement was made in 
course of express questioning to which motorist had 
already responded, and officer should have known 
the statement was reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response. 
[6] Criminal Law €==>412.2(2) 
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110k412.2(2) Most Cited Cases 
Motorist was not in "custody," for Miranda 
purposes, when officer elicited motorist's 
incriminating statement that he had smoked 
marijuana; objective indicia of arrest were missing, 
interrogation occurred on public road, officer's 
statement that he "knew" motorist had used drugs 
was not so accusatory that it would cause 
reasonable person to feel his freedom of action had 
been significantly limited, and although encounter 
lasted over an hour, such time frame was not 
unreasonable, as car had two occupants in addition 
to 
motorist and law enforcement support personnel 
had to travel to scene. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
[7] Criminal Law €=^412.2(2) 
110k412.2(2) Most Cited Cases 
Miranda does not require law enforcement officers 
to warn suspects before interrogation in all cases; 
rather, Miranda requirements apply only when the 
suspect is subject to formal arrest or restraint on 
freedom of movement of the degree associated with 
a formal arrest. 
[8] Criminal Law €^412.2(2) 
110k412.2(2) Most Cited Cases 
Whether events surrounding an interrogation 
amount to custody, so that Miranda warnings are 
required, depends on the objective circumstances 
and not on the subjective views harbored by either 
the interrogating officer or the person being 
questioned. 
[9] Criminal Law €=>412.2(2) 
110k412.2(2) Most Cited Cases 
Under Utah law, the court determines whether the 
defendant was in custody, for Miranda purposes, 
with reference to four factors: (1) the site of 
interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused 
on the defendant; (3) whether objective indicia of 
arrest were present; and (4) the length and form of 
interrogation. 
[10] Criminal Law €=^412.2(2) 
110k412.2(2) Most Cited Cases 
In deciding the custody issue, as element for 
requiring Miranda warnings, the totality of the 
circumstances is relevant, and no one factor is 
dispositive. 
[11] Criminal Law €=^519(9) 
110k519(9) Most Cited Cases 
The question of whether a police statement is so 
accusatory as to coerce a suspect into an unwanted 
confession is a question of degree which the trial 
court is best suited to decide. 
[12] Witnesses €=?406 
410k406 Most Cited Cases 
Defendant's testimony, in drug possession 
prosecution, that "I don't smoke marijuana" and "I 
haven't smoked marijuana," opened the door to 
admission, as impeachment evidence, of defendant's 
prior felony drug conviction. Rules of Evid., Rule 
609. 
[13] Witnesses €=^406 
410k406 Most Cited Cases 
When a defendant testifies that he has never used 
drugs, a trial court does not abuse its discretion 
when it allows the prosecution to present evidence 
of the defendant's prior conviction for drug 
possession, as impeachment evidence. Rules of 
Evid., Rule 609. 
[14] Witnesses €==>406 
410k406 Most Cited Cases 
When a defendant seeks to mischaracterize a prior 
conviction, the court does not abuse its discretion in 
allowing the State to use prior conviction evidence 
as impeachment evidence to directly contradict the 
defendant's previous inaccurate testimony. Rules of 
Evid., Rule 609. 
*847 Margaret P. Lindsay, Orem, for Appellant. 
Carlyle Kay Bryson and Nyal C. Bodily, Provo, for 
Appellee. 
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**1 Ralpft Levin challenges his conviction for 
possession or use of marijuana with a prior 
conviction under Utah Code section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
and for possession of drug paraphernalia under 
Utah Code section 58-37a-5(l). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
**2 In May 2001, Deputy Wayne Keith was 
patrolling along the Provo Dike Road when he 
noticed that the registration tags of a convertible car 
parked on the side of the road were expired. He 
pulled up behind the car and walked to the car on 
foot to notify its three occupants. The car's 
convertible roof was down, and, while standing 
beside the car, Deputy Keith noticed several open 
containers hi plain view and asked the occupants for 
identification. Upon a subsequent search of the 
vehicle, he found a "socket" tool that had been used 
to smoks m^jvvaaa, *&&! s&N«ra\ sov&W bags* 
containing marijuana in a backpack. Deputy Keith 
radioed for drug recognition officers to assist at the 
scene. Wfren the officers arrived they conducted 
several field sobriety tests that indicated that the 
driver, Levin, had been smoking marijuana. When 
Deputy Keith asked Levin if he had been smoking 
marijuana, Levin responded *848 that he had not. 
At some point, Deputy Keith stated that he knew 
Levin had been smoking marijuana, to which Levin 
responded he had. 
**3 Levin was cited for possession or use of 
marijuana with a prior conviction, in violation of 
Utah Code section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998), and for 
possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of 
Utah Code section 58- 37a-5(l) (1998). He pleaded 
not guilty to both counts. 
**4 Before trial, Levin moved to suppress 
statements he made at the time of his citation, 
claiming that Deputy Keith had subjected him to 
custodial interrogation without informing him of his 
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 
S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The court 
denied the motion on May 22, 2002. 
**5 Prior to trial, Levin also moved to exclude 
evidence of a prior conviction for possession or use 
of marijuana and moved to bifurcate the matter of 
his prior conviction. The trial court granted both 
motions on May 14, 2002. However, during his 
direct examination at trial, Levin stated that "I don't 
smoke jnarijuana, and I haven't smoked marijuana." 
Before cross-examination, the State asked the court 
to rule on the admissibility of Levin's prior drug 
conviction in light of the statements he had made 
during direct examination. The court concluded 
that Levin's statements had "opened the door" and 
permitted the State to admit evidence of Levin's 
prior dfug conviction under rule 609 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. At the conclusion of evidence, 
the judge read an instruction explaining that the jury 
could only consider the prior conviction evidence 
for assessing credibility. 
**6 The jury convicted Levin on both counts. On 
appeal, Levin challenges the trial court's denial of 
tas m < ^ to s t r e s s a&d *& courts v*Hs% to 
permit evidence of prior crimes. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1][2] **7 " 'In reviewing the trial court's denial of 
[a defendant's] motion to suppress, we examine the 
underlying factual findings for clear error, and 
review the trial court's conclusions of law based 
thereon for correctness.' " State v. Allred, 2002 UT 
App 291,1 8, 55 P.3d 1158 (quoting State v. Hayes, 
860 P.2d 968, 971 (Utah Ct.App.1993)). However, 
because the determination of custody is 
fact-sensitive and " 'the facts to which the legal rule 
is to be applied are so complex and varying that no 
rule adequately addressing the relevance of all these 
facts c^n be spelled out,' " we recognize that the 
trial court has a degree of discretion "unless such 
determination exceeds established legal 
boundaries." State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 929 
(Utah Ct.App.1994) (quoting State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994)) (other citations 
omitted)-
[3] **8 With regard to the court's determination to 
admit evidence of Levin's prior conviction, we 
review the trial court's conclusion for abuse of 
discretion. See Jensen v. Intermountain Power 
Agency, 1999 UT 10,1f 12, 977 P.2d 474 ("[I]n 
reviewing a trial court's decision to admit or 
exclude evidence, we allow for broad discretion."). 
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ANALYSIS 
I. Motion to Suppress 
A. Trial Court's Findings of Fact 
**9 The trial court entered the following findings 
of fact in its May 22, 2002 order denying Levin's 
motion to suppress: 
1. On May 2, 2001, Deputy Wayne Keith was 
patrolling Provo Dike Road that is located just 
south of the Provo Boat Harbor. This is a public 
road. 
2. Deputy Keith observed a convertible vehicle 
that was parked on the side of the road. Deputy 
Keith noticed that the registration was expired on 
the vehicle and subsequently stopped his vehicle 
behind the parked convertible. Deputy Keith did 
not activate his overhead lights or his siren when 
he parked behind the vehicle. Furthermore, he 
did not block their vehicle from moving or 
leaving with the position of his vehicle. 
3. Deputy Keith observed three occupants sitting 
in the car. 
4. Deputy Keith approached the vehicle on foot 
and observed several open containers of alcohol 
in plain view in both the *849 front and rear area 
of the passenger compartment of the vehicle. 
5. Deputy Keith asked for the three passenger's 
[sic] identification. Defendant was determined to 
be the individual sitting in the driver's seat. 
6. Deputy Keith asked the occupants to step out 
of the vehicle and [explained] that he was going 
to search for more open containers. 
7. Deputy Keith began searching the vehicle for 
open containers. In the center console, which 
was large enough to house an open container, 
Deputy Keith smelled the odor of marijuana and 
observed a metal "socket" that was fashioned into 
a pipe. The socket smelled of marijuana and 
appeared to have marijuana residue in the "pipe." 
8. In a back-pack in the back seat, Deputy Keith 
found three plastic bags that were determined to 
contain marijuana. The rear[-] seated passenger 
stated it was his back-pack. 
9. Deputy Keith asked Defendant about the 
socket that was found in the center console 
between the driver's and passenger seat[s]. 
Defendant stated he did not know it was there and 
insisted that he had not smoked any marijuana. 
At this time, Defendant was not under arrest nor 
© 2005 ThomsonAVest. No C 
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was he handcuffed. 
10. Within a short time, two other officers 
arrived. Because Defendant was in the driver's 
seat, Defendant was asked to perform some field 
sobriety tests. 
11. The officer that conducted the field sobriety 
tests on Defendant, Deputy Todd Orton, was a 
certified Drug Recognition Expert. After the 
conclusion of the field sobriety tests, Deputy 
Orton believed Defendant was possibly under the 
influence of marijuana; however, it was felt that 
he was not impaired to the point that he could not 
safely operate a motor vehicle. 
12. Deputy Orton informed Deputy Keith of his 
belief that the Defendant was possibly under the 
influence of marijuana but that he was not 
impaired to the point that he could not safely 
operate a motor vehicle. 
13. Deputy Keith then told Defendant that he 
"knew he had smoked marijuana." This was not 
phrased in the form of a question. Furthermore, 
no evidence was elicited on cross-examination 
that Deputy Keith made this comment while 
confronting the Defendant or while "in his face." 
No evidence was attained that was anything more 
than a statement casually made to Defendant. 
14. Up to this point, Defendant had maintained a 
lack of knowledge of the marijuana or the pipe. 
However, Defendant then told Deputy Keith that 
he had only taken a couple of hits of marijuana 
while at that location. He stated that both he and 
the back seated passenger had smoked out of a 
pipe. 
15. Deputy Keith was surprised when Defendant 
stated he had smoked marijuana while at that 
location. Deputy Keith testified that he did not 
expect Defendant to say anything in response. 
Deputy Keith did not even ask a question and was 
surprised when Defendant responded with an 
incriminating statement. 
16. Defendant, along with the other occupants of 
the vehicle, was never arrested, never handcuffed 
and was merely given a citation. Defendant was 
then allowed to drive the vehicle away from the 
location with his friends as passengers. 
Based on these facts, the trial court concluded that 
Levin was neither in custody nor subject to 
interrogation such that Deputy Keith was required 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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to provide him with a Miranda warning. In his 
appeal, Levin does not dispute these factual 
findings; rather, he claims that the court "erred in 
its conclusion that [he] was not in custody or 
subject to interrogation for Miranda purposes," 
B. Miranda Warnings 
[4] **10 Police officers must provide Miranda 
warnings prior to subjecting a suspect to a 
"custodial interrogation," which is defined as 
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers 
after a person has been taken into custody or 
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436,444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 
*850 1. Interrogation 
[5] **11 As an initial matter, we disagree with the 
trial court's determination that Keith's questions did 
not result in an "interrogation" for purposes of 
Miranda. The Supreme Court has defined 
"interrogation" to comprise "not only ... express 
questioning, but also ... any words or actions on the 
part of police (other than those normally attendant 
to arrest and custody) that the police should know 
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 
301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). Thus, 
statements by police "to which no response from the 
respondent [are] invited" do not constitute an 
"interrogation." Id. at 302, 100 S.Ct. 1682. 
However, a "lengthy harangue in the presence of the 
suspect" may amount to an interrogation. Id. at 
303, 100 S.Ct. 1682. Although Keith's statement to 
Levin may not have been punctuated with a 
question mark, it was made in the course of express 
questioning to which Levin had already responded. 
Given this context, Keith's assertion was a type 
Keith "should know [was] reasonably likely to elicit 
an incriminating response" from Levin. Id. at 302, 
100 S.Ct. 1682. Thus, we must conclude that the 
statement was the "functional equivalent" to express 
questioning and, therefore, an "interrogation." Id. 
at 301, 100 S.Ct 1682. 
2. Custody 
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[6][7][8] **12 Nonetheless, we agree with the trial 
court's determination that Levin was not in 
"custody" at the time the interview took place. 
Miranda does not require law enforcement officers 
to warn suspects before interrogation in all cases. 
Rather, Miranda requirements only apply when the 
suspect is subject to " 'formal arrest or restraint on 
freedom of movement of the degree associated with 
a formal arrest.' " Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 
318, 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) 
(per curiam) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 
U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 
(1983)) (other quotations and citation omitted). 
Whether events surrounding an interrogation 
amount to custody depends on the "objective 
circumstances" and "not on the subjective views 
harbored by either the interrogating officer[ ] or the 
person being questioned." Id. at 323, 114 S.Ct. 
1526. 
[9][10] **13 Under Utah law, we determine 
whether a suspect was in custody with reference to 
four factors; " '(1) the site of interrogation; (2) 
whether the investigation focused on the accused; 
(3) whether objective indicia of arrest were present; 
and (4) the length and form of interrogation.' " 
State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1996) 
(quoting Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 
1171 (Utah 1983)). We emphasize that " 'in 
deciding the custody issue, the totality of the 
circumstances is relevant, and no one factor is 
dispositive.' " State v. Worthington, 970 P.2d 714, 
716 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (quoting Stansbury, 511 
U.S. at 321,114 S.Ct. 1526) (alteration omitted). 
**14 We begin by listing those factors that suggest 
Levin was not in custody. First, the objective 
indicia of arrest are missing: there were no "readied 
handcuffs, locked doors or drawn guns." Carner, 
664 P.2d at 1171. Second, the site of the 
interrogation was a public road. Traffic stops on a 
public road, even if in a relatively remote location, 
generally do not create the type of situation in 
which "the motorist feels completely at the mercy of 
the police." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 
438, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). Also, 
the open setting of the road, unlike the confines of a 
police station or cruiser, reasonably "diminishes the 
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motorist's fear that, if he does not cooperate, he will 
be subjected to abuse." Id. 
**15 We now turn to those factors that could 
sustain a determination that Levin was in custody. 
Levin's argument focuses primarily on the duration 
of the encounter, which he describes at one point as 
lasting an hour and at another point as lasting an 
hour and a half. Generally, traffic stops are 
afforded a presumption of validity because they are 
"temporary and brief in nature and the suspect 
knows that "in the end he will most likely be 
allowed to continue on his way." Id. at 437, 104 
S.Ct. 3138. Here, however, a stop for over an hour 
is more extensive than a routine traffic stop and, 
thereby, raises some concern that it may be intrusive 
enough to constitute custody. 
*851 **16 In determining at what point a stop 
begins to assume the character of an arrest, we note 
that the Supreme Court has rejected bright-line time 
limits to police stops: " '[W]e question the wisdom 
of a rigid time limitation. Such a limit would 
undermine the equally important need to allow 
authorities to graduate their responses to the 
demands of any particular situation.' " United 
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 
1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (quoting United 
States v. Place, 462 U S. 696, 709 n. 10, 103 S.Ct. 
2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983)). We too are 
reluctant to conclude that the mere fact that a stop 
lasted over an hour is conclusive of custody. 
**17 Rather, we consider the reasonableness of 
the stop in light of the totality of the circumstances. 
We have recognized that investigative stops 
involving several suspects must be afforded 
additional time. See State v. Alfred, 2002 UT App 
291,T[ 13, 55 P.3d 1158 (questioning six suspects 
for up to forty minutes does not constitute custody). 
Similarly, it is reasonable for a stop to require over 
an hour when an officer calls support personnel who 
must travel to the scene. See State v. Garbutt, 173 
Vt. 277, 790 A.2d 444, 449- 50 (2001) (holding 
that detaining suspect for seventy-five minutes 
while awaiting support personnel did not constitute 
custody); People v. Forster, 29 Cal.App.4th 1746, 
35 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 709-10 (1994) (holding that 
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detaining suspect for "a little more than an hour" 
while awaiting support personnel did not constitute 
custody). Here, although Levin was detained for 
over an hour, that amount of time was not 
unreasonable given the circumstances. The officers 
were dealing with three suspects at the scene and 
had to perform a number of tasks, which included 
(1) collecting identification from each suspect, (2) 
investigating and collecting evidence regarding a 
possible open container violation, (3) investigating 
and collecting evidence regarding possible drug 
possession and use, (4) summoning and awaiting 
support officers trained in drug recognition, (5) 
performing field sobriety tests on each suspect for 
alcohol and drug consumption, and (6) preparing 
citations. Taken together, a stop lasting over an 
hour under these circumstances is not unreasonable. 
**18 Levin next argues that he was in "custody" 
because he was the focus of Deputy Keith's 
investigation and because Deputy Keith directly 
accused him of using drugs. We recognize that "a 
police officer's subjective view that the individual 
under questioning is a suspect, if undisclosed, does 
not bear upon the question of custody for purposes 
of Miranda." Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 
318, 324, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) 
(per curiam). However, when a police officer 
expresses his suspicions to a suspect, "[t]hose 
beliefs are relevant only to the extent that they 
would affect how a reasonable person in the 
position of the individual being questioned would 
gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of action." 
Id. at 325, 114 S.Ct. 1526 (quotations and citation 
omitted). Thus, "[e]ven a clear statement from an 
officer that the person under interrogation is a prime 
suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody 
issue.... The weight and pertinence of any 
communications regarding the officer's degree of 
suspicion will depend upon the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case." Id. 
**19 Here, then, we must determine whether 
Deputy Keith's assertion that he knew Levin had 
used drugs would cause a reasonable person in 
Levin's position to feel his "freedom of action" had 
been significantly limited. See id. On this issue, 
the facts of this case are largely analogous to those 
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of State v. Strausberg, 895 P.2d 831 (Utah 
Ct.App.1995). There, the defendant fled from the 
scene of an accident he had caused, and police used 
descriptions provided by witnesses to later identify 
and stop him. See id. at 832. After observing 
evidence of the collision on the vehicle, a police 
officer asked the defendant if he had been in an 
accident that night. See id. The defendant denied 
any involvement. See id. Without giving a Miranda 
warning, the officer explained that witnesses had 
identified a similar vehicle at the scene of the 
accident, and, confronted with this information, the 
driver made incriminating statements. See id. 
**20 In determining whether the defendant was in 
custody, the Strausberg court held that " '[b]ecause 
the determination of custody for Miranda purposes 
is fact sensitive, we *852 accord a measure of 
discretion to the trial court's determination unless 
such determination exceeds established legal 
boundaries.' " Id. at 834 n. 5 (quoting State v. 
Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 929 (Utah CtApp. 1994)). 
The court then concluded that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in concluding the defendant was 
not in custody because the "question was not 
coercive and was merely investigatory in nature." 
Id. at 835. 
[11] **21 We agree that the question of whether a 
police statement is so accusatory as to coerce a 
suspect into an unwanted confession is a question of 
degree for which the trial court is best suited to 
decide. [FN1] Therefore, in determining whether 
Deputy Keith's statement was so accusatory that it 
would "affect how a reasonable person ... would 
gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of action," 
Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325, 114 S.Ct. 1526 
(quotations and citations omitted), we afford the 
trial court considerable discretion. 
FN1. The trial court is in a superior 
position to weight fact-intensive 
considerations because "it is before that 
court that the witnesses and parties appear 
and the evidence is adduced." State v. 
Pena} 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
Thus, "[t]he judge of that court is therefore 
considered to be in the best position to 
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assess the credibility of witnesses and to 
derive a sense of the proceeding as a 
whole, something an appellate court cannot 
hope to garner from a cold record." Id. 
**22 In this case, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in determining that "although the 
statement made by Deputy Keith was accusatory, it 
was not overly accusatory." Such a conclusion does 
not "exceed [ ] established legal boundaries," 
particularly because the Strausberg court reached a 
similar conclusion with similar facts. 895 P.2d at 
834-35. As such, we rely on the trial court's 
determination that Deputy Keith's statement was not 
so accusatory as to coerce Levin into making an 
incriminating statement. 
**23 Based on these considerations, we conclude 
that the totality of the circumstances in this case 
weigh against a determination that Levin was in 
"custody" for Miranda purposes. Accordingly, we 
affirm the trial court's denial of Levin's motion to 
suppress. 
II. Admissibility of Prior Conviction Evidence 
[12] **24 Prior to trial, Levin also moved to 
exclude evidence of a prior conviction for 
possession or use of marijuana and moved to 
bifurcate the matter of the prior conviction. The 
trial court granted both motions on May 14, 2002. 
However, during the May 22, 2002 trial, the 
following exchange took place during Levin's direct 
examination: 
Q. Okay. Did [Deputy Keith] ask you any other 
questions at that point? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did he ask you if you had been smoking 
marijuana.. 
A. He did. 
Q... at that point? 
A. Yes, he did. He asked me if I had been 
smoking, if it was mine, and I told him it's not 
mine, and I don't smoke marijuana, and I haven't 
smoked marijuana. 
Before the State began its cross examination, it 
asked the court to allow it to question Levin 
regarding his prior drug conviction. After a brief 
hearing, the trial court determined that Levin had 
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"opened the door" to such evidence when he 
"misled the jury and left the jury with a potential 
false impression" by testifying that "I don't smoke 
marijuana, and I haven't smoked marijuana." On 
cross-examination, Levin admitted his prior drug 
conviction, and, at the conclusion of evidence, the 
court instructed the jury to consider the prior 
conviction evidence only for the purpose of 
weighing credibility. 
**25 Evidence of a prior conviction for a crime 
punishable in excess of one year is admissible under 
Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence "if the 
court determines that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs it prejudicial 
effect to the accused." Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1). 
Rule 403 also applies to exclude evidence "if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury." Utah R. Evid. 403. As 
mentioned above, we review the trial court's ruling 
on these evidentiary matters only for abuse of 
discretion. See *853 Jensen v. Intermountain 
Power Agency, 1999 UT 10,112, 977 P.2d 474. 
[13][14] **26 When a defendant testifies that he 
has never used drugs, a trial court does not abuse its 
discretion when it allows the prosecution to present 
evidence of the defendant's prior conviction for 
drug possession. See Gee v. Pride, 992 F.2d 159, 
161-62 (8th Cir.1993) (admitting evidence of prior 
conviction for drug possession after defendant 
testified he had never used PCP) (construing 
Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)). Similarly, when a defendant 
seeks to mischaracterize a prior conviction, the 
court does not abuse its discretion in allowing the 
State to use prior conviction evidence "to directly 
contradict the defendant's previous inaccurate 
testimony." State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 824 
(Utah Ct.App.1990) (admitting evidence of cocaine 
use relating to prior attempted forgery conviction); 
see also United States v. Valencia, 61 F.3d 616, 
619 (8th Cir.1995) (admitting details of past drug 
conviction when defendant "attempted to minimize 
his guilt regarding the prior conviction") 
(construing Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)). 
**27 In the present case, the court did not abuse 
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its discretion in determining that Levin's statements 
that "I don't smoke marijuana" and "I haven't 
smoked marijuana" could mislead jurors. Nor did it 
abuse its discretion when it concluded that the prior 
conviction evidence would have substantial 
probative value in clarifying the record and 
remedying any mischaracterizations. Finally, the 
court limited any improper prejudicial effect by 
instructing the jury to consider the evidence only for 
purposes of credibility. 
CONCLUSION 
**28 We conclude that the trial court did not err in 
denying Levin's motion to suppress and did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Levin's 
prior drug conviction at trial. Accordingly, we 
affirm. 
**29 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, 
Presiding Judge, and WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., 
Judge. 
101 P.3d 846, 512 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 2004 UT 
App 396 
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State of Utah, 
Respondent, 




This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on Jan 3, 2005. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted as to the following issue: 
Whether the court of appeals applied the correct standard of 
review in reviewing the district court's determination that the 
defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda protections. 
A briefing schedule will issue hereafter. Pursuant to rule 
2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that permits 
the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to submit their 
briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be permitted to 
stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent extraordinary 
circumstances, no extensions will be granted by motion. The 
parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon its 
issuance. 
f, %dd$ 
/ Christine M. Durham 
Chief Justice 
Addendum C 
Fourth Judicial District Court of 
^
h n?? s U R t y - S t a t e o f Utah. CARMAE5, SMITH, Clerk 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, ORDER 
Case No. 011402539 
HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS 
This matter came before this Court on January 16, 2002, for a hearing on Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress. Defendant Ralph Levin was present and represented by Jennifer Gowans. 
The State was represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney, John J. Easton. The Court, having 
heard testimony from the lead officer, Deputy Wayne Keith, allowed Defendant additional time to 
conduct additional research and file a supplemental brief supporting her initial Motion to 
Suppress. Oral argument was heard on February 13, 2002. Defendant had filed a supplemental 
brief and was again represented by Jennifer Gowans. The State was represented by John J. 
Easton. Having heard the relevant testimony and oral arguments on this matter, the Court does 
hereby make and enter the following Finding of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
US 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
The following facts were established at the Suppression Hearing held in this matter that 
was conducted on January 16, 2002: 
1. On May 2, 2001, Deputy Wayne Keith was patrolling Provo Dike Road that is 
located just south of the Provo Boat Harbor. This is a public road. 
2. Deputy Keith observed a convertible vehicle that was parked on the side of the 
road Deputy Keith noticed that the registration was expired on the vehicle and 
subsequently stopped his vehicle behind the parked convertible. Deputy Keith did 
not activate his overhead lights or his siren when he parked behind the vehicle. 
Furthermore, he did not block their vehicle from moving or leaving with the 
position of his vehicle. 
3. Deputy Keith observed three occupants sitting in the car. 
4. Deputy Keith approached the vehicle on foot and observed several open containers 
of alcohol in plain view in both the front and rear area of the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle. 
5. Deputy Keith asked for the three passenger's identification. Defendant was 
determined to be the individual sitting in the driver's seat. 
6. Deputy Keith asked the occupants to step out of the vehicle and that he was going 
to search for more open containers. At-tha^ffie^Deputy^K^^ 
%ffieefsr~ 
7. Deputy Keith began searching the vehicle for open containers. In the center 
console, which was large enough to house an open container, Deputy Keith 
smelled the odor of marijuana and observed a metal "socket" that was fashioned 
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into a pipe. The socket smelled of marijuana and appeared to have marijuana 
residue in the "pipe." 
8. In a back-pack in the back seat, Deputy Keith found three plastic bags that were 
determined to contain marijuana. The rear seated passenger stated it was his back-
pack. 
9. Deputy Keith asked Defendant about the socket that was found in the center ^J 
console between the driver's and passenger seat. Defendant stated he^e^kriow it 
was there and insisted that he had not smoked any marijuana. At this time, 
Defendant was not under arrest nor was he handcuffed. 
10. Within a short time, two other officers arrived. Because Defendant was in the 
driver's seat, Defendant was asked to perform some field sobriety tests. 
11. The officer that conducted the field sobriety tests on Defendant, Deputy Todd 
Orton, was a certified Drug Recognition Expert. After the conclusion of the field 
sobriety tests, Deputy Orton believed Defendant was 
influence of marijuana, however, it was felt that he was not impaired to the point 
that he could not safely operate a motor vehicle. ^v 
12. Deputy Orton informed Deputy Keith of his belief that the Defendant was-hketjr 
under the influence of marijuana but that he was not impaired to the point that he 
could not safely operate a motor vehicle. 
13. Deputy Keith then told Defendant that he "knew he had smoked marijuana " This 
was not phrased in the form of a question. Furthermore, no evidence was elicited 
on cross-examination that Deputy Keith made this comment while confronting the 
Defendant or while "in his face." No evidence was attained that this was anything 
more than a statement casually made to Defendant. 
no 
14. Up to this point, Defendant had maintained a lack of knowledge of the marijuana 
or the pipe. However, Defendant then told Deputy Keith that he had only taken a 
couple hits of marijuana while at that location. He stated that both he and the back 
seated passenger had smoked out of a pipe. 
15. Deputy Keith was surprised when Defendant stated he had smoked marijuana 
while at that location. Deputy Keith testified that he did not expect Defendant to 
say anything in response. Deputy Keith did not even ask a question and was 
surprised when Defendant responded with an incriminating statement. 
16. Defendant, along with the other occupants of the vehicle, was never arrested, 
never handcuffed and was merely given a citation. Defendant was then allowed to 
drive the vehicle away from that location with his friends as passengers. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. DEFENDANT WAS NOT IN CUSTODY 
The safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom 
of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966); State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996) However, a "person may be seized for 
Fourth Amendment purposes but not be in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes. State v. 
Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1996). Whether one is "in custody" for Miranda purposes 
depends on an objective assessment of the circumstances of the interrogation with respect to the 
compulsory nature of the interrogation rather than on the subjective intent or suspicions of the 
officers conducting the examination, [citation omitted] Id, at 1147. Particularly, in the context of 
a routine traffic stop, the driver and the passengers, even though they have been stopped and, at 
least momentarily, are not free to leave, are not "in custody" for Miranda purposes. Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); State v. Mirquet, 914P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1996). 
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During a routine traffic stop even if an officer engages in some degree of accusatory 
questioning of the driver during the course of the stop and even though the officer may have a 
subjective, unstated intent to arrest the driver, the person is not "in custody" for purposes of the 
Fifth Amendment. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 
1144, 1147 (Utah 1996). 
Because Defendant was not placed in handcuffs, restrained in the police vehicle, or 
restrained in any physical way other than being stopped for various violations he was never placed 
in formal arrest. Because Defendant was never formally arrested, this Court had to determine 
whether Defendant was in "custody" requiring the safeguards against self incrimination through a 
Miranda warning. 
There are occasions when a defendant is entitled to & Miranda warning prior to a formal 
arrest; therefore, to determine when an individual is "in custody" the Utah Supreme Court has 
outlined four factors. Salt Lake City v. Carrier, 664P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983). To determine 
whether an individual is in custody, courts must look to (1) the site of interrogation; (2) whether 
the investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were present; 
and (4) the length and form of interrogation. Id, at 1171. 
(1) Defendant was questioned while on the side of the road by his vehicle. He 
was never questioned while at the police station, jail or while inside the 
squad car. Defendant was always outside on a public road with his 
passenger friends during this entire episode. 
(2) The investigation did not focus solely on the accused. Defendant was one 
of three individuals that were stopped and cited that night. Both 
passengers of the vehicle were cited for either marijuana or open 
containers. Furthermore, the investigation focused on all three individuals. 
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(3) There were no objective indicia of arrest present. Defendant was never 
handcuffed. Defendant was never placed in a squad car. Defendant stood 
on the side of the road next to his vehicle with his friends the entire time. 
Defendant was conversing with his friends during this time. Vehicle sirens 
and lights were not used by Deputy Keith Defendant even drove away 
from the scene. Defendant performed field sobriety tests; however, he was 
not under arrest and could have refused to comply with any of those 
requests. 
(4) The length and form of interrogation was not inherently long. It was never 
elicited on direct or cross-examination exactly how long the detention* 
lasted. Furthermore, the "interrogation" was not even in the form of a 
question and was only an accusatory statement. 
Although "the accusatory nature of questioning is a relevant factor in determining whether 
a person is in custody,... it is not dispositive of the issue. Moreover, whether the interrogating 
officer entertains subjective suspicions that the subject has committed a crime is irrelevant." State 
v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Utah 1996). "Although many encounters between citizens and 
police, especially in the context of a traffic stop, can give rise to accusatory-type questioning, that 
factor alone does not dispositively determine whether a person is in custody." Id, at 1148. 
The mere fact that Defendant is asked to perform field sobriety tests and that there are 
three officers present does not amount to a determination that the Defendant is in "custody" 
requiring a Miranda warning. Furthermore, although the statement made by Deputy Keith was 
accusatory, it was not overly accusatory. Defendant had maintained a lack of knowledge of any 
drugs, marijuana or paraphernalia. Deputy Keith testified that he did not expect Defendant to 
answer him when he told Defendant that "he knew he had been smoking marijuana." Deputy 
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Keith was surprised when Defendant subsequently stated that he had smoked marijuana that night 
while parked there. 
Since a "traffic stop is substantially less police dominated" than typical interrogation the 
"noncoercive aspect of traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant 
to such stops are not in custody for the purposes of Miranda." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 
420, 440 (1984); State v. East, 743 P.2d 1211, 1222 (Utah 1987) 
In analyzing the four factors established by the Utah Supreme Court in Carrier the facts 
of this case do not lead to the determination that Defendant was in custody at the time he 
admitted to smoking marijuana. Defendant was on the side of the road and not in the police car, 
the investigation was not focused solely on the Defendant, there were no objective indicia of 
arrest as Defendant was never arrested, handcuffed or physically restrained and Deputy Keith's 
statement was not a "form of interrogation." 
The Court hereby finds that Defendant was not in custody at the time he made 
incriminating statements and Defendant's motion is denied. 
B. DEFENDANT WAS NOT SUBJECT TO INTERROGATION WHEN HE 
ADMITTED SMOKING MARIJUANA 
Defendant was not subject to interrogation or the functional equivalent of interrogation at 
the time he admitted smoking marijuana. 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), the Supreme Court held that "the 
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial 
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to 
secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Subsequently, in Rhode Island v. Innis, the Court 
held that the safeguards of Miranda are required whenever a person in custody is subjected to 
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either express questioning or its "functional equivalent." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U S. 291, 
301 (1980). That court went on to define the "functional equivalent" of interrogation as, 
any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to 
arrest or custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response from the suspect. Id, at 301. 
Deputy Keith's statement was not phrased in the form of a question. He merely stated 
that he knew the Defendant had smoked marijuana. Up until this point, the Defendant had denied 
smoking any marijuana; therefore, it is very reasonable to believe that the Defendant would either 
not respond or would maintain his denial. This mere statement was not a question that Deputy 
Keith "knew or should know was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response" from the 
Defendant. Deputy Keith even testified that he was surprised when Defendant made an 
incriminating response by stating he had smoked marijuana that night. 
"[Vjolunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their 
admissibility is not affected by [Miranda]" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). This 
confession was not in response to interrogation. Defendant was not asked a question. Deputy 
Keith did not expect Defendant to respond to his statement. Deputy Keith was not coercive in his 
statement. He was not threatening Defendant or telling him that he would charge him with the 
crimes anyway. 
Accordingly, although not dispositive due to the finding that the Defendant was not in 
custody at the time he made incriminating statements, this Court holds that not only was 
Defendant not in custody but he was also not subject to interrogation. 
8 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the court hereby Orders 
that the defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED. 
Signed this /<£ day of /f//&/ , 2002. 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
A 
snni^r K. Gow; Jenni^r R. Lro ans 
Attorney for Defendant 
^p^h^V 
John J J&aston 
Attorney for Plaintiff State of Utah 
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Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, ORDER to the following on the day of , 2002: 
Jennifer Gowans 
ABBOTT, SPENCER & SMITH, LLC 
39 West 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
VIRGINIA CLOWARD 
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